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ABSTRACT
It is increasingly common to outsource data storage to untrusted,
third party (e.g. cloud) servers. However, in such settings, low-level
online reference monitors may not be appropriate for enforcing
read access, and thus cryptographic enforcement schemes (CESs)
may be required. Much of the research on cryptographic access
control has focused on the use of specific primitives and, primarily,
on how to generate appropriate keys and fails to model the access
control system as a whole. Recent work in the context of role-
based access control has shown a gap between theoretical policy
specification and computationally secure implementations of access
control policies, potentially leading to insecure implementations.
Without a formal model, it is hard to (i) reason about the correctness
and security of a CES, and (ii) show that the security properties
of a particular cryptographic primitive are sufficient to guarantee
security of the CES as a whole.
In this paper, we provide a rigorous definitional framework for
a CES that enforces read-only information flow policies (which
encompass many practical forms of access control, including role-
based policies). This framework (i) provides a tool by which instanti-
ations of CESs can be proven correct and secure, (ii) is independent
of any particular cryptographic primitives used to instantiate a CES,
and (iii) helps to identify the limitations of current primitives (e.g.
key assignment schemes) as components of a CES.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Manymulti-user systems require some form of access control which
requires specifying and enforcing a policy that defines the actions
each user is authorized to perform. Traditionally, enforcement has
required trusted on-line monitors to evaluate access requests. How-
ever, this approach is not necessarily appropriate for systems where
the policy enforcement mechanism is not controlled by a trusted
party (e.g. the policy author), or if the mechanism is not always
available. An alternative is to use cryptographic techniques.
A Cryptographic Enforcement Scheme (CES) to control read ac-
cess to data objects must, at its most basic, provide a method to
protect (encrypt) data and issue users the necessary cryptographic
materials (keys) to access (decrypt) data that they are authorized
to read. Furthermore, changes to the policy, such as extending or
retracting the access rights of a user, or changing the security level
of an object should be supported by the CES; such policy changes
can have an effect on both the required cryptographic material, and
on the security and correctness of the policy enforcement itself. Fur-
thermore, as cryptographic material is vulnerable to compromise
or leakage through exposure, a CES should provide a mechanism
to refresh cryptographic material.
Whilst enforcement by a trusted monitor is guaranteed to per-
mit only authorized requests, efficient cryptographic primitives are
usually computationally secure (due to their probabilistic nature).
Further, there may be real-world concerns to be addressed by an
implementation that are not required in idealized, theorectical mod-
els. Thus, as observed by Ferrara et al. [12], there may exist a gap
between the theoretical specification of an access control policy
and a cryptographic implementation of an enforcement mecha-
nism. Hence, one must carefully consider whether cryptographic
primitives can achieve the correctness and security requirements to
properly enforce an access control policy and, if multiple primitives
are required, they can be safely combined. A vital part of such con-
sideration is the establishment of rigorous definitions and security
models for the required functionality of a CES.
To emphasize the gap between policy specification and crypto-
graphic enforcement mechanisms, let us consider Key Assignment
Schemes (KASs) [3] used to enforce an information flow policy (sim-
ilar arguments can be made for other primitives such as functional
encryption schemes). In general, KASs define how key material
is generated, and derived, for a given access structure but do not
define algorithms for encrypting objects, updating key material,
or for carrying out changes to the policy. In fact, this additional
functionality can have a significant effect on the cryptographic
material supplied by the KAS — e.g. assigning a user additional
access rights may require extra keys to be securely distributed to
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the user, whilst the removal of a user typically requires that all of
their keys (at least) be updated, under the assumption that users
may locally store their keys and could continue to decrypt objects
for which they are no longer authorized. If such changes are not
implemented carefully, the security and correctness of the KAS
itself could be compromised, as well as that of the CES as a whole.
1.1 Related Work and Motivation
Many cryptographic enforcement mechanisms have been proposed,
primarily to enforce read access to data objects via an encryption
mechanism. Two particularly notable proposals are Key Assign-
ment Schemes (KASs) [2, 9] and functional encryption schemes,
especially Attribute-based Encryption (ABE) [6, 17]. Throughout
this paper, we shall periodically refer to both KASs and ABE as
example cryptographic mechanisms that may be used within the
context of a CES.
In general, write access can be more difficult than read-access to
cryptographically enforce and typically requires additional assump-
tions on the trustworthiness and capabilities of the storage provider,
or additional trusted entities [10]. In particular, whilst one can often
use cryptographic primitives that provide data origin authentica-
tion to detect data originating from an unauthorized writer [14, 22],
it can be difficult to prevent unauthorized writes to the (externally
controlled) file-system in the first place. Furthermore, to ensure cor-
rectness of the system following an unauthorized write, one must
ensure the storage provider maintains the ability to ‘roll-back’ data
objects or to otherwise ensure that legitimate writes are maintained.
In this paper, like most related work, we focus our attention on
read-only policies, with the observation that detection mechanisms
should be a simple future extension to this work if required.
Key Assignment Schemes (KASs) [2, 9] are symmetric crypto-
graphic primitives that can be used to enforce read-only information
flow policies. Security notions for KASs [3] capture the require-
ments that no (collusion of) users may compute a key for which they
are unauthorized (key recovery), and the stronger notion that no
information is leaked about keys for which users are unauthorized
(key indistinguishability (KI)).
While the above security notions capture the required security
of generated keys (i.e keys do not reveal information about other
keys), they do not capture the distribution, use and update of such
keys. Furthermore, when considering the use of a KAS within a
CES, it becomes clear that key recovery is not a suitable property
and that key indistinguishability alone is not sufficient. Indeed, the
security requirements of a KAS and CES are intrinsically different.
Key indistinguishability of a KAS states that a user who is not
authorized to hold a key cannot learn anything about the key even
having learned the keys of other unauthorized users. We argue
that a secure CES requires that an unauthorized user attempting
to access a particular object cannot learn anything about the data
written to that object1 even if it can learn the keys of other unau-
thorized users, see the entire file-system, know the data written
to other objects, and force certain policy updates. In other words,
security for KASs is defined in terms of decryption keys, whilst we
1In the context of a CES where objects are stored on an externally controlled file-
system, we cannot prevent physical access to an object but instead must protect the
data written to an object from being learned by unauthorized entities.
consider the more relevant property of access to objects which, as
we will see, is not the same as prior security notions.
Clearly, without defining the required protection properties for
objects, which keys are to be used, and how keys should be handled,
it is not necessarily true that a lack of knowledge about a single key
implies that nothing is learned about an object in a CES. Indeed,
the logical combination of a KI-secure KAS and an IND-CPA secure
encryption scheme [5] can be trivially insecure if, for example,
the file-system leaks information about other keys defined by the
KAS when writing objects. Whilst this simple example is very easy
to avoid, other scenarios may be more subtle, especially when
using multiple, complex cryptographic primitives with intricate
security properties in a system, such as a CES, comprising many
components, entities and feasible execution paths. Thus we believe
that the requirements of a CES system as a wholemust be considered
rather than just a single component. At the very least, it must be
clear what the security and correctness objectives of the system are
in order to select suitable cryptographic components.
To this end, Ferrara et al. [12] emphasize the importance of
providing a formal model for secure Cryptographic Role-based
Access Control. They describe how cryptographic access-control
schemes often only informally analyze the gap between policy spec-
ification and a proposed implementation. To illustrate this point,
they describe how cryptographic guarantees are probabilistic whilst
policies are deterministic (some party does/does not have access
to some object). Gifford [15] previously presented a framework
for cryptographic access control (including information flow), but
could not, at the time, consider modern cryptographic security
notions for computationally secure primitives, and presented sepa-
rate models for symmetric and asymmetric primitives. In contrast,
our framework provides formal cryptographic games to model cor-
rectness and security and is defined independently of particular
cryptographic primitives. In concurrent work, Damgård et al. in-
troduced the notion of Access Control Encryption [10] which aims
to restrict write access within an encryption scheme. Whilst this
work certainly appears to be in a promising direction, it requires
an additional entity known as the Sanitizer to process all data sent
over public channels.
1.2 Contributions
In order to ensure that a cryptographic mechanism adequately
enforces an information flow policy, it is vital to have a rigorous
and concrete framework to specify the functional, correctness and
security requirements of a CES. The aim of this paper is to introduce
such a framework, which is intended to be useful to designers and
implementers of CESs, both to guarantee the adequacy of existing
proposals and to identify areas that need further research.
Ferrara et al. [12] studied the setting of role-based access control
(RBAC). In this paper, we consider CESs for read-only informa-
tion flow policies. Crampton [8] showed that many access control
policies of practical interest, such as attribute- and role-based poli-
cies, can be represented as information flow policies; therefore,
our framework is widely applicable and can be viewed as a con-
tinuation of the work of Ferrara et al. to bridge the gap between
the specification of access control models and the capabilities of
cryptographic primitives. Indeed, as future work, Ferrara et al. [12]
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suggested modeling general access control frameworks; one can
view our work as a step towards this goal.
Whilst there is a wealth of work considering cryptographic ac-
cess control requirements [1, 2, 9, 11, 14, 17–21], such works often
focus on using particular cryptographic primitives or are tailored
to a specific application. In contrast, we start from the specification
of a general access control policy (information flow policies), from
which we identify the requirements of a CES. We do not target any
particular primitives and, instead, aim to provide a framework that
can be instantiated by a range of cryptographic primitives, both
symmetric and public key. We define several classifications of CESs
based on their desired, generic, functionality. As a result, we hope
to provide a framework within which one can analyze specific CES
instantiations to ensure correctness and security.
We begin in Section 2 by introducing some notation and recalling
basic concepts related to information flow policies. In Section 3, we
introduce our model of CESs and classify the required functionality,
before defining correctness and security in Section 4. In Section 5,
we discuss some example schemes, highlighting their shortcomings
in the context of our model. We conclude the paper with a summary
of our contributions and some ideas for future work.
2 PRELIMINARIES
We write a ← x to denote the assignment of x to variable a, whilst
a
$←− X denotes a being assigned a value selected uniformly at
random from the set X . We write a ← B(c) to denote a polynomial
time algorithm B being run on input c and the output being assigned
to a, and write a $← B(c) if B is probabilistic polynomial time (PPT).
We denote a security parameter by ρ and its unary representation
by 1ρ . A function f is negligible if, for every polynomial p(·), there
exists an N such that for all integers n > N , f (n) < 1p(n) .
We use the symbol⊥ to denote (i) failure when output by an algo-
rithm, and (ii) a null value when assigned to a variable. We denote
the elements of a list or array A of n elements by A[0], . . . ,A[n − 1].
A partially ordered set or poset is a pair (L,⩽), where ⩽ is a
binary, reflexive, anti-symmetric, transitive relation on L. For a
poset (L,⩽), we write x < y if x ⩽ y and x , y and may write
x > y if y < x . The empty set is denoted ∅.
A read-only information flow policy is a tuple P = ((L,⩽),U ,O, λ),
where (i) (L,⩽) is a partially ordered set of security labels; (ii)U is the
set of users; (iii)O is the set of data objects; and (iv) λ : U ∪O → L
is a function mapping users and objects to security labels in L. We
say u ∈ U is authorized to read an object o ∈ O if λ(o) ⩽ λ(u).
For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we may choose
U and O to be arbitrarily large and fixed, and assume that L has
a top element ⊓ and a bottom element ⊔. For any object o that is
“dormant” or “inactive”, we set λ(o) equal to ⊓; and for any user u
that is dormant, we set λ(u) to be ⊔. No user is assigned to ⊓ and no
object is assigned to ⊔. In other words, inactive objects cannot be
read by any user, and inactive users cannot read any object. Then,
to model the addition of a user or object, we can instead activate a
dormant user or object by changing the security label from ⊔ or ⊓,
respectively; users and objects can similarly be removed by setting
the security label to ⊔ or ⊓.
Traditionally, access control policies can be enforced by inter-
cepting all attempts by users to interact with protected objects and
determining whether the interaction is authorized. These functions
are performed by what is known as a reference monitor (or, in
more modern settings, the policy enforcement and policy decision
points), a trusted software component that implements the logic
of the authorization policy to evaluate a request from u to read o.
Roughly speaking, the reference monitor instructs an unintelligent
storage system to release an object to the user if the interaction is
found to be authorized.
3 CRYPTOGRAPHIC ENFORCEMENT OF
INFORMATION FLOW POLICIES
Recently, we have seen considerable interest in outsourcing the
storage of data. In this case, the storage provider, not the data owner,
controls access to the data. Moreover, the storage provider may
have incentives to inspect the data it stores on behalf of its clients.
Conversely, the data owner may not wish the storage provider to
have read access to the data. Thus, informally, the data owner may
wish to encrypt data before giving it to the storage provider, thus
preventing the storage provider (and any entity to which the storage
provider releases the data) from reading the data. In addition, the
data owner will distribute appropriate keys to authorized users.
As mentioned, we focus on read access in this paper. We assume
that the data owner (or a manager entity) is responsible for the
protection of all objects and supplying the encrypted objects to
the storage provider via an authenticated channel. (In practice, the
manager could represent a set of authorized writers if required.) The
storage provider simply stores all encrypted objects it is given and
releases them on request to users. In other words, the storage system
is essentially public and all users have access to all encrypted
objects (but not all users have access to all decryption keys). We
model the storage provider as an honest-but-curious adversary —
it will store objects correctly and release them on request, but may
try to learn information about the stored contents.
As mentioned in the introduction, we believe it is important,
especially when considering complex cryptographic primitives, to
have a rigorous framework for the requirements of a CES, both
to aid the design of CESs and to identify areas for future work. In
this section, we formulate the requirements of a read-only CES,
building from the access control requirements of the policy with
no particular instantiation or cryptographic primitives in mind.
Indeed, our definitions of the algorithms that a CESmust implement
are intentionally general, in order to cater for different possible
instantiations. In particular, our definitions may be instantiated
using symmetric or asymmetric cryptographic primitives. Where
appropriate, we shall, however, refer to example instantiations to
illustrate certain concepts.
3.1 State Requirements
In a CES, data objects are encrypted using some kind of crypto-
graphic primitive and access to an object is effected by decrypting.
Thus, any CES needs to maintain a certain amount of cryptographic
material, some of which will be public and some secret, held by
different entities. We begin our development of a framework by
considering the information, or state, that each entity within a CES
must maintain, distinguishing between user, object and system
states. We distinguish between an object (as created by the data
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Notation Meaning Part of
stM State of the manager/system -
α(l) Secret material associated to label l stM
ϕ Private additional information held by
the manager
stM
Π Public information including the file-
system FS
-
FS Public file-system Π
π (l) Public material associated to label l Π
ψ Additional public information Π
o An object identifier O
d(o) Data written to o o
d(o) Protected form of o FS
u A user identifier U
stu State of user u -
Table 1: Notation used for modeling states of entities
owner) and its state in the system (in a protected format with any
necessary metadata). We will then, in Section 3.2, consider the al-
gorithmic requirements to use, maintain and update these states,
which will lead us to consider a classification of CESs according to
their functional requirements. Table 1 summarizes the notation we
shall introduce in the next section to describe states in a CES.
3.1.1 System. Clearly, within a CES, some cryptographic ma-
terial must be generated. This is performed by the trusted system
manager (or data owner),M. The manager will also need to use
some of the generated material to protect objects as they are written
(recall that the manager performs all write operations in a read-
only CES), to refresh existing material throughout the lifetime of
the system, and to grant access to users (by distributing appropriate
material). Therefore, the manager must store some or all of the
material it generates for later use. We denote the state, containing
all information currently held by the manager, by stM .
In information flow policies, access is determined in terms of
security labels. Hence, a CES for such policies may require, for each
label l ∈ L:
• some secret information, denoted α(l) (e.g. cryptographic
material for performing encryption and decryption of ob-
jects that have security label l ); and
• some public information, denoted π (l) (e.g. public informa-
tion to aid the derivation of α(l) in a KAS).
Each user u must be provided with a means to learn some or all
of α(l) for all l ⩽ λ(u). Similarly, each object o must be protected
using some or all of α(λ(o)).
The manager must store (or be able to efficiently regenerate) α(l)
for each label such that it may be issued to users when relevant.M
may also require additional material to perform his duties (beyond
that associated purely to labels) e.g. additional system parameters.
We denote such material, which is known only to M, by ϕ. The
private state ofM is therefore:
stM = (ϕ, {α(l)}l ∈L).
The manager must also make certain information publicly avail-
able to users and the storage provider. We have already seen that
some public information, π (l), related to security labels may be re-
quired. In addition, the file-system, FS , containing all protected ob-
jects (i.e. the information that is outsourced to the storage provider)
is assumed to be publicly available (as any entity can request any
outsourced data directly from the storage provider) and therefore
forms part of the public state of the system. Finally, we may define
ψ to be any additional public information required by a particular
instantiation. The public state of the system is therefore:
Π = (ψ , {π (l)}l ∈L , FS).
We refer to the state of the system as a whole as stM and Π and
note that, together, they model all information held in the system
(we shall shortly introduce user states which will identify which
components of the system state is held by which entities).
Example 3.1. Consider a CES instantiated using the ABE scheme
of Goyal et al. [17], where each attribute corresponds to a secu-
rity label. Then, for each label l ∈ L, the manager must define a
secret exponent α(l) ∈ Zp and compute a public group element
π (l) = дα (l ). Furthermore, the manager must store additional secret
information ϕ ∈ Zp (the system-wide secret exponent). Finally, Π
must additionally store the masking termψ = e(д,д)ϕ .
3.1.2 Objects. Each object within a CES must be protected
according to its security label. The protected object is written to a
file-system maintained by an untrusted storage provider.
In non-cryptographic settings for information flow policies, ob-
jects can be abstractly modeled entirely by an identifier and their
security label — a reference monitor is guaranteed to permit or deny
access to objects based only on consideration of security labels. This
is not the case in a CES: the enforcement mechanism (encryption)
operates not only on the label but also on the content of an object
o (the data) and the cryptographic material (α(λ(o)) and π (λ(o)))
associated to the label.
With these considerations in mind, we introduce the following
notation to fully describe an object in O :
• o is a unique identifier which allows us to refer simply to
an object and to apply the labeling function λ;
• d(o) is the data written to the object o and to which we
wish to control access; and
• d(o) denotes the protected form of o that is outsourced and
to which all entities have access. We may assume that d(o)
includes the label λ(o).
Hence, we assume that the set of objects O is a set of pairs of the
form (o,d(o)). Then the public data includes the file-system FS
which contains a set of pairs of the form (o,d(o)).2 It may be helpful
to think of o as a filename, d(o) as the contents of a file and d(o) as
the encrypted file. Clearly, one can refer to the entire object simply
by referring to the filename, and writing to the file may change the
content d(o) without changing the filename.
2Note that in this work, we aim to protect only d (o), and not any further meta-data
of objects. In particular, the identifiers and security labels of objects are assumed to
be public such that users can efficiently decide which objects to retrieve from the
file-system and how to decrypt them.
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3.1.3 Users. A user u is authorized to read an object o if λ(u) ⩾
λ(o). Hence, u must be given information (derived from material
contained in stM ) that enables u to decrypt objects. This infor-
mation may simply be the decryption keys associated with labels
l ⩽ λ(u), or data that enables the derivation of those keys. For
example, in many key assignment schemes [3], a user u ∈ U is
given a single secret σ (λ(u)) enabling the derivation of decryption
keys associated to any y ⩽ λ(u). We may assume that stu contains
the label λ(u).
3.2 Functional Requirements
Having determined the minimal information that each entity must
hold within a CES, we now look at the required algorithms. We
shall see that one can model many different forms of CES depending
on the required functionality, and this shall lead us to produce a
classification of CESs.
A CES must support, at least, the following algorithms:
(stM , {msдu }u ∈U ,Π) $←− Setup(1ρ , P);
(d(o) or ⊥) ← Read(o, stu ,Π).
Setup is probabilistic and takes the policy P = ((L,⩽), U ,O, λ) and
a security parameter 1ρ as input. (Informally, ρ determines the
strength of cryptographic keys.) It generates an initial system state
(stM and Π) enabling the remaining algorithms to run, and a set of
messages that will be sent to users so that users can initialize their
respective user states, stu . The initial data d(o) for all objects o ∈ O
is protected and written to the file-system (within Π).
We assume thatmsдu is sent over a secure channel to the useru ∈
U . In effect, we assume that any messages sent by the manager to
users are received as intended and without leaking any information
to an adversary. (However, as we discuss in Section 4.2, we will
allow an adversary to corrupt users, thereby allowing the adversary
to learn user state.)
Read, run by a useru, is a deterministic algorithm which takes as
input the identifier of an object to which access is being requested,
the state of the user requesting access and the public information
for the CES, which includes the file-system and, in particular, d(o).
The algorithm uses the cryptographic material contained within stu
(and perhaps Π) to attempt to remove the protection mechanism
applied to the data d(o). It outputs d(o) (the data last written to o)
if λ(u) ⩾ λ(o), and an error symbol ⊥ otherwise.
The Setup and Read algorithms alone are sufficient to provide
the basic functionality required to enforce an information flow
policy cryptographically — that is, Setup generates cryptographic
material and protects objects, whilst Read removes the protection
if the user is authorized. However, we note that it may be necessary,
more efficient or otherwise convenient to extend the number of
algorithms used. We now discuss some of these alternatives.
3.2.1 Writeable. Although Setup writes the initial data d(o)
specified by the policy for each object in O , in many systems one
may wish to update the data stored in objects over the course of
the system lifetime. A writeable CES allows the manager to update
objects and supports the following algorithm:
Π
$←−Write(o,d(o)′, stM ,Π)
This algorithm takes as input the object identifier o to be written to,
the data d(o)′ to be written to object o, the state of the manager, and
public information. It outputs updated public information, which
includes (o,d(o)′) in FS .
3.2.2 Refreshability. Over time, cryptographic material may
need to be refreshed if material is compromised or lost, or following
the removal of an authorized user. Computing advances or the
threat of a long-running attack may also necessitate periodic key
refreshing. Thus, many CESs should include a mechanism by which
cryptographic material can be updated.
Whilst a trivial solution would be to update cryptographic mate-
rial simply by re-running the Setup algorithm, this will update all
keys within the system simultaneously. It is likely more efficient to
provide a targeted Refresh algorithm (to be run by the manager):
(stM , {msдu }u ∈U ,Π) $←− Refresh(l , stM ,Π).
Refresh takes a label l ∈ L, the state stM of the manager and Π as
input (which, together, contain the material α(l) and π (l) associated
to the target label), and outputs updated values of stM and Π, along
with a set of messages {msдu }u ∈U , which may contain updated
cryptographic material for authorized users.
We say that a CES is refreshable if it uses a Refresh algorithm,
rather than Setup, to update cryptographic material on a per-label
basis. Refreshes may also result in changes to the cryptographic
material associated with other security labels; we denote this set of
labels by L′. (In a CES instantiated using an iterative key assignment
scheme [3], for example, L′ = {l ′ ∈ L : l ′ ⩽ l}.) Following a refresh,
therefore, we may need to update Π, stu for some users (typically
those where λ(u) ∈ L′) and d(o) for objects o where λ(o) ∈ L′.
3.2.3 Dynamic Policy. In some settings, it may be that the sets
of objects and users never change (the policy is static). The Setup
algorithm may assign the appropriate labels and cryptographic
materials for all users and objects, and write all objects to the file-
system. In some systems, however, a user or object’s label may be
changed to/from any label in L during the lifetime of the system
(e.g. in the event that a user’s role changes or an object becomes
declassified). A basic solution to fulfilling this requirement is to
re-run the Setup algorithm with a modified labelling function.
A more dynamic (and potentially more efficient) approach is to
introduce randomized algorithms ChUsL and ChObL, for changing
a user and object’s label respectively:
(stM , {msgu}u ∈U ,Π)
$←− ChUsL(u, l ′, stM ,Π);
(stM , {msgu}u ∈U ,Π)
$←− ChObL(o, l ′, stM ,Π).
Both algorithms take the identifier of the user or object and the
new label l ′ ∈ L to be assigned, along with the manager state and
public information, and result in updated manager states and public
information along with update messages for each user that may
update the user state stu .
Note that, for example, ChUsL may affect the states of other
users (or the secret information α(y) associated to labels y , l ′)
e.g. if the access rights of u are decreased then the cryptographic
material for all labels that u is no longer authorized for may need
to be changed; subsequently, objects protected using keys that have
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CES Class Algorithms Run by
Basic Setup Manager
Read User
Writeable Write Manager
Refreshable Refresh Manager
Dynamic ChUsL Manager
ChObL Manager
Decentralized UserUpdate User
Table 2: Algorithms required in different classes of CES
been updated may require re-protecting. Typically, ChObL could
be implemented by decrypting d(o), calling Refresh on λ(o) and
re-encrypting d(o) using α(l ′).
Recall that we assume a large population of users, many of which
may be assigned to ⊔. The “creation” of a user may be modeled as
the activation of a user that has been assigned to ⊔, whilst user
deletion can be modeled as the assignment of an existing user to ⊔.
We can create and delete objects in a similar fashion by assigning
from and to the label ⊓. We say a CES is dynamic if it supports
ChUsL and ChObL.
3.2.4 Decentralized Updates. Note that several algorithms (Setup,
ChUsL and Refresh) are run by the manager and require resulting
updates to a user’s local state stu . Certainly, since user states are
subsets of the manager state, the manager could compute the up-
dated stu for all u that are affected, and distributemsдu containing
stu . We call this a centralized update as it is performed entirely by
the manager. However, this may place an unnecessarily onerous
burden on the manager. In some instantiations, a more efficient
solution (in terms of manager workload and bandwidth costs) may
be to provide each user u with (a smaller amount of) data that
enables u to derive stu themselves. For example, each user could
use some key derivation function to update their own user state
using a counter value or nonce broadcast by the manager. Hence,
we introduce a final algorithm UserUpdate, run by the user:
stu ← UserUpdate(stu ,msдu ,Π).
3.2.5 Classes of CES. We have seen that CESs in different set-
tings may require different functionality. In Table 2, therefore, we
classify CESs according to their required properties. We do not
claim this classification to be exhaustive but believe that it captures
many of the generic requirements of CESs. Each class of CES also
includes the algorithms of those in the Basic class, and classes may
be combined. Each algorithm may return ⊥ to denote failure e.g. if
the inputs are invalid.
To achieve a general definition satisfiable by any suitable cryp-
tographic primitives, we have strived to define general, abstract
input and output parameters for each algorithm that act as general
‘containers’, into which one can place the required cryptographic
components of the particular primitives in use. Whilst our defini-
tions may appear complicated, due to their generality, we believe
that they give the simplest possible definition of a CES, since they
show the required information flow between algorithms without
relating parameters with their supposed format within a particular
instantiation (e.g. we do not specify that an input is a cryptographic
key, but a more general parameter that may or may not contain one
or more keys when instantiated by a particular construction). For
example, looking at the Setup algorithm, we see that to initialize the
system one must specify the policy to be enforced and the level of
security required, and the algorithm simply generates some private
information (state) for each entity (manager and users) and some
public information accessible to all. We shall see concrete examples
of how such a CES can be instantiated in Section 5.
3.2.6 System State Transition. The evolution of a CES over time
can be modeled as a series of state transitions, St
a−→ St+1, where a
is an algorithm run by the manager that results in a change to the
policy.3 In a CES for a static, refreshable policy, for example, the
Setup and Refresh algorithms cause a transition to another state –
Read does not change the state of the system and thus produces a
trivial or null state transition.
We now attempt to specify the minimal sets of items within
the system that must be updated in some way to ensure that the
enforcement scheme reflects the updated system following a com-
mand. The specific forms of updates will be very dependent on
the specific implementation. Some schemes may choose to update
additional items (e.g. non-refreshable schemes may update all user
states following an update). Here, we simply attempt to identify the
minimal sets of items that are affected and that any implementation
must deal with. For our purposes, we assume that all necessary
updates are performed immediately i.e. we do not employ a lazy
update mechanism.
Note that a transition from a state St = (stM ,Π) to another state
St ′ = (st′M ,Π′) only occurs if the associated conditions hold.
• Write(o,d(o)′, stM ,Π): if o ∈ O , the manager protectsd(o)′
(using cryptographic material related to o and λ(o)) and
updates d(o) ∈ Π.
• Refresh(l , stM ,Π): If l ∈ L, then let L′ be the set of la-
bels whose cryptographic material depends on that of l
(e.g. in an iterative KAS [9], L′ = {l ′ ∈ L : l ′ ⩽ l}). Then
{α(l),π (l) : l ∈ L′} gets updated. All objects that are pro-
tected under cryptographic material that has been updated
will need re-protecting under the refreshed material. Let
O ′ be the set of such objects, then {d(o) : o ∈ O ′} must
be updated. In addition, a set of users, U ′, whose crypto-
graphic material has been updated will also need to be
issued material to update their user states.
• ChUsL(u, l ′, stM ,Π): If l ′ ∈ L \ ⊓, u ∈ U and λ(u) , l ′,
set L′ =
{
l ∈ L : l ⩽ λ(u), l ⩽̸ l ′} (this is precisely the set
of labels for which u is no longer authorized). Then we
need to update the set C = {α(l),π (l) : l ∈ L′}, and set
λ(u) ← l ′. For every object o ∈ O protected using material
in C , d(o) is updated. The smallest set of users whose state
needs updating is the set of users {u ′ ∈ U : λ(u ′) ∈ L′}.
• ChObL(o, l ′, stM ,Π): Let l = λ(o). If l ′ ∈ L \ ⊔, o ∈ O and
l , l ′, set λ(o) ← l ′ and update d(o). κl and π (l) should
3Since user states can be computed from the manager state and public information,
they need not form part of the system state; therefore we do not consider UserUpdate
as an algorithm that causes a system state transition.
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be refreshed4. Such key refreshes are required to prevent
the following scenario: suppose a user u locally stores d(o),
where λ(o) = l , and u is not authorized for l . Suppose o is
reassigned to label l ′, where l ′ > l , or l ′ ∥ l , and ChUsL
is run such that λ(u) = l . Now, if κl has not been updated,
then u can access the contents of his stored copy of d(o),
although u is not authorized for o since λ(o) ⩽̸ λ(u).
4 CORRECTNESS AND SECURITY
The security properties of a system employing cryptographic prim-
itives are often defined using games. A game is “played” between
a challenger and an adversary, A, and seeks to model the actions
of the adversary and its interactions with the system (represented
by the challenger). A game typically comprises an interleaving of
calls made by the challenger to algorithms provided by the system,
and calls made by the adversary to “oracles”. An adversary given
oracle access is denoted AO , where the O denotes the set of or-
acles to which the adversary has access. We assume that all data
sent amongst entities is done so via confidential and authenticated
channels; the adversary is given access to publicly observable infor-
mation, and oracles model his ability to act as the storage provider
and to corrupt users to learn any confidential information available
to attackers in a real system that take similar actions.
Informally, oracles allow the adversary to influence the system by
triggering the execution of algorithms, without necessarily know-
ing all inputs to each algorithm. This mechanism allows the adver-
sary, to some degree, to ‘embed’ information of its choosing into
the system and to control its execution; the resulting knowledge
of the system represents any prior knowledge an adversary may
have about a real system. Furthermore, oracles model an adversary
taking ‘real-world’ actions that result in an algorithm being run
by the manager — for example, an adversary may take a course
of action (e.g. placing an order with a company) which it suspects
will cause some data to be written to the file-system, and it may
have some guess about the contents of that data; in the crypto-
graphic game, this is modeled by allowing the adversary to request
data (its guess) to be written (via aWrite oracle), even though the
adversary does not have the capability (e.g.the necessary access
rights or encryption keys) to write to the file-system in the real
system. If an adversary can glean any additional information from
seeing protected objects (where the adversary knows the contents)
in the game, it may be able to determine such information about
the contents of data objects in a real file-system.
Most oracles include a call to a system algorithm and take as
input a subset of the inputs to that algorithm. We do not provide
oracles for Setup or any user-run algorithms as the adversary can
run these itself. An oracle may also perform some validation of the
inputs to ensure that the adversary does not provide inputs that
could permit a “trivial win”. The only information the adversary
may learn is that which is explicitly given to it as input and that
which is output from oracles (together this should be chosen to
reflect all possible leakage in the real system).
4An efficient instantiation may add l to a refresh list and only update its key and public
information when necessary (e.g. use lazy update mechanisms).
For the purposes of this framework, wemake the assumption that
all updates following a state transition occur immediately. In prac-
tice, one may need to lock files whilst updates are performed [14].
4.1 Correctness
Informally, an information flow policy is correctly enforced if all
authorized requests are permitted — that is, if a user u can read
any object o where λ(o) ⩽ λ(u). When considering a cryptographic
enforcement mechanism, we would like to consider a stronger
notion of correctness whereby we ensure that it is not possible for
the system to enter a state in which an authorized user performing
a Read operation does not receive the correct data (the last data
that should have been written to the object). To do so, we model
the system as a game, given in Figure 1, played between a scheduler
A which can observe and control the execution of the system and
a challenger; by considering all such schedulers we consider all
possible valid sequences of algorithms.
The aim of the experiment (from the scheduler’s perspective) is
to force the system into a state in which the output of reading an
object o⋆ does not equal the data that should have been last written
to this object. We must ensure that the protection mechanism can
be applied to, and removed from, data correctly by authorized
users, and that the algorithms specified in the CES do not interfere
with this operation. Recall that the storage provider is modeled as
an honest-but-curious adversary; we therefore need not consider
integrity properties since the provider is trusted to accept data only
from the manager and to store it (unmodified) in the file-system.
In effect, we must ensure our specified algorithms conform to our
expectation of a correct execution; we do not consider malicious
storage providers that deviate from these algorithms in this work.
The experiment, given as ExpCorrectnessCES,A (1ρ , P) in Figure 1, begins
with the challenger setting up the system and initializing an array
A, where A[o] contains the data d(o) for each object o ∈ O defined
in the policy; this array is used to store the data that (according
to the policy and any subsequent write requests) should currently
be stored by the storage provider. The challenger then gives A
the public information and access to a set of oracles (also shown
in Figure 1), which enables A to run CES algorithms on inputs
of its choice. Most oracles simply check that the inputs are valid,
update the policy or the array A as required, and then call the
relevant CES algorithm. The Corrupt oracle allows the scheduler
to learn the user state for a queried user (i.e. everything that the
user knows) which models compromised or colluding users. The
challenger maintains a list Cr of users that have been corrupted.
Recall that some algorithms output a set of update messages for
some users. Messages for users that the scheduler has corrupted
are given to A (in this way, A learns any additional, leaked, in-
formation from the update messages and can choose to update
the corrupted user state itself in a decentralized CES). The chal-
lenger runs the UserUpdate algorithm to update the state of all
non-corrupted users so that they remain synchronized with the
remainder of the system, and so any future corruptions will reveal
a correctly updated user state.
After polynomially many queries to the oracles, the scheduler
selects a challenge object identifier o⋆ ∈ O and a user u⋆ ∈ U . The
challenger then runs Read for o⋆ using the state of the user u⋆. If
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ExpCorrectnessCES,A (1
ρ, P )
Cr← ∅
foreach o ∈ O :
A[o]← d(o)
(stM, {msgu}u∈U ,Π)
$←− Setup(1ρ, P )
(o?, u?)
$←− AO(1ρ, P,Π)
if (λ(u?) > λ(o?)) and (Read(o?, stu? ,Π) 6= A[o?]) :
return true
else : return false
Oracle CorruptU(u)
if u 6∈ U : return ⊥
Cr← Cr ∪ {u}
return stu
Oracle ChUsL(u, l′)
if (u ∈ U and l′ ∈ L \ u) :
λ(u)← l′
(stM, {msgu}u∈U ,Π)
$←− ChUsL(u, l′, stM,Π)
foreach u ∈ U \ Cr :
stu ← UserUpdate(stu,msgu,Π)
return ({msgu}u∈Cr ,Π)
Oracle ChObL(o, l′)
if (o ∈ O and l′ ∈ L \ unionsq) :
λ(o)← l′
(stM, {msgu}u∈U ,Π)
$←− ChObL(o, l′, stM,Π)
foreach u ∈ U \ Cr :
stu ← UserUpdate(stu,msgu,Π)
return ({msgu}u∈Cr ,Π)
Oracle Write(o, d(o)′)
if (o ∈ O) :
A[o]← d(o)′
Π
$←−Write(o, d(o)′, stM,Π)
return Π
Oracle Refresh(l)
if l 6∈ L : return ⊥
(stM, {msgu}u∈U ,Π)
$←− Refresh(l, stM,Π)
foreach u ∈ U \ Cr :
stu ← UserUpdate(stu,msgu,Π)
return ({msgu}u∈Cr ,Π)
Figure 1: Correctness of a CES
u⋆ is authorized for o⋆, and Read does not output A[o⋆] (the data
that should have been most recently written to o⋆), the scheduler
wins — it has found a sequence of state transitions that results in
an authorized user not gaining the correct data.
Definition 4.1. Let P = ((L,⩽),U,O, λ) be an information flow
policy. A CES for P is correct if for all probabilistic polynomial-time
schedulers A, all valid policies P and all security parameters ρ:
Pr
[
true← ExpCorrectnessCES,A (1ρ , P)
]
= 0
4.2 Security
Informally, a CES for a read-only information flow policy is secure
if it denies all unauthorized read requests e.g. a user u cannot learn
d(o) if λ(u) ⩾̸ λ(o). A stronger cryptographic notion of security
may require that unauthorized users can learn nothing about the
contents of objects for which they are unauthorized.5 Unlike an en-
forcement mechanism based on a reference monitor, there are often
no absolute guarantees of security in a CES because cryptographic
primitives are probabilistic. Thus, security is defined in terms of
the probability of an adversary learning something about an object
that they are not authorized to read.
An ideal notion of security may be semantic security [16]. Un-
fortunately, it can be difficult to model exactly what is meant by
an adversary learning ‘no information’ in arbitrary settings as one
must account for any prior information the adversary may have
about data in the file-system (e.g. the language). Instead, it is com-
mon to consider an indistinguishability game [5] in which the
adversary can choose data to be written (a chosen plaintext attack).
In our indistinguishability game for a CES, the adversary chooses
a challenge object (for which it is unauthorized) and two data values.
The challenger chooses one of the data values at random and writes
it to the chosen object. To win, the adversary, having observed the
file-system, must state which data item was written. The adversary
can clearly win 50% of the time by guessing; thus we model the
5Whilst a user u who was authorized for an object o may have learned the contents
of d (o) prior to the object’s label being changed such that u is no longer authorized
for o, the user should not be able to read any further writes to o.
adversary’s advantage in this game as the difference between the
probability of identifying the encrypted data correctly and 12 . For a
secure CES, we require this advantage to be close to 0.
This notion of indistinguishability implies (is stronger than) the
notion that a user is not able to decrypt d(o) if λ(u) ⩾̸ λ(o). Whilst
the weaker notion requires only that the entirety of d(o) is not
revealed, our notion requires that no information about d(o) may
be leaked from an outsourced d(o) (even when the adversary may
choose the data options to maximize its ability to distinguish the
resulting protected data items). This ensures that the file-system
reveals nothing about written data (except perhaps metadata such
as file-size); if any additional information were to leak, an adver-
sary could win this game by choosing two messages that can be
distinguished by the leaked information.
Our notion of security of a CES for an information flow policy
P = ((L,⩽),U,O, λ) is captured in ExpIndCES,A (1ρ , P) in Figure 2.
The challenger C randomly chooses a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and a challenge
object identifier o⋆, and initializes an empty list Cr of corrupted
users. C then initializes the system via Setup and then provides the
adversary A with the public information and oracle access.
After polynomially many oracle queries, A chooses an object
identifier o⋆ and two data items d0 and d1 (of equal length). C
checks that no corrupted user is authorized for o⋆ (to prevent a
trivial win for the adversary) and writes db to o⋆. The resulting
public parameters, and oracle access, are given to the adversary
who must correctly identify the data item written to the object.
Oracles may perform ‘housekeeping’ to ensure that inputs are
valid and do not permit a trivial win by allowing A to:
(1) corrupt a user who is authorized for o⋆;
(2) change the challenge object’s label such that a corrupted
user is now authorized for o⋆;
(3) change a corrupted user’s label such that the user is now
authorized for o⋆.
Note that the set of oracles the adversary has access to depends
on the class of CES. Recall that a non-refreshable CES may be
(inefficiently) refreshed by recalling Setup with new policy inputs;
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ExpIndCES,A(1
ρ, P )
b
$←− {0, 1}; o? ←⊥;Cr← ∅
(stM, {msgu}u∈U ,Π)
$←− Setup(1ρ, P )
(o?, d0, d1)
$←− AO(1ρ, P,Π)
if |d0| 6= |d1| : return false
foreach u ∈ Cr :
if λ(o?) 6 λ(u) :
return false
Π
$←−Write(o?, db, stM,Π)
b′ $←− AO(1ρ, P,Π)
if b = b′ : return true
else return false
Oracle ChObL(o, l′)
if o = o? :
foreach u ∈ Cr :
if l′ 6 λ(u) : return ⊥
if (o ∈ O and l′ ∈ L \ unionsq) :
λ(o)← l′
(stM, {msgu}u∈U ,Π)
$← ChObL(o, l′, stM,Π)
foreach u ∈ U \ Cr :
stu ← UserUpdate(msgu, stu)
return (Π, {msgu}u∈Cr)
Oracle ChUsL(u, l′)
if (u ∈ Cr and λ(o?) 6 l′) : return ⊥
if (u ∈ U and l′ ∈ L \ u) :
λ(u)← l′
(stM, {msgu}u∈U ,Π)
$← ChUsL(u, l′, stM,Π)
foreach u ∈ U \ Cr :
stu ← UserUpdate(msgu, stu)
return (Π, {msgu}u∈Cr)
Oracle Refresh(l)
(stM, {msgu}u∈U ,Π)
$← Refresh(l, stM,Π)
foreach u ∈ U \ Cr :
stu ← UserUpdate(msgu, stu)
return (Π, {msgu}u∈Cr)
Oracle Write(o, d(o)′)
Π
$←−Write(o, d(o)′, stM,Π)
return Π
Oracle CorruptU(u)
if u 6∈ U : return ⊥
if λ(u) > λ(o?) :
return ⊥
Cr← Cr ∪ {u}
return stu
Figure 2: Security of a CES
we therefore provide a Refresh oracle so that the adversary can
influence the manager to call Setup. A non-refreshable CES will
replace the call to Refresh within the Refresh oracle with a call to
Setup with the current policy as input. In our model, we do not
permit the poset to change over time, and hence the only input to
the Refresh oracle is the label to be refreshed; the adversary may
not specify the new policy as this may include an alternative poset
(permitted policy changes can be effected through other oracles).
Whenever the policy is to be updated, the challenger updates
the policy correctly and calls the relevant algorithm. Thus, the
challenger’s view of the policy is always correct, enabling the checks
for trivial wins to be performed correctly.
Definition 4.2. A CES for an information flow policy is secure if
for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversariesA, all valid policies
P and all security parameters ρ:Pr [true← ExpIndCES,A (1ρ , P) ] − 12  ⩽ f (ρ)
where f is a negligible function.
One may observe that a secure CES, in accordance with Defini-
tion 4.2, must employ some form of foward-security (e.g. one should
not be able to learn old versions of label keys). This prevents users
locally storing ciphertexts for objects that used to be assigned to
a security label l , obtaining authorization for l , and being able to
derive the old key for l to enable successful decryption of such
ciphertexts.
5 EXAMPLE INSTANTIATIONS
A Key Assignment Scheme (KAS) [3] is defined by:
• ({κx ,σx }x ∈L , Pub) $←− KAS.Setup(1ρ , (L,⩽)) takes a secu-
rity parameter and a poset and outputs a key κx and secret
σx for each label x ∈ L, along with some public derivation
information Pub ; and
• κx or ⊥← KAS.Derive(x ,y,σy , Pub) takes labels x ,y ∈ L,
the secret for y and Pub , and outputs the key for label x if
and only if x ⩽ y, else it outputs ⊥.
Each user is given a secret associated to their security label and
can derive all keys for which they are authorized. Figure 3 gives
(stM, {msgu}u∈U ,Π) $←− Setup(1ρ, P )
Parse P as ((L,6), U,O, λ)
({κx, σx}x∈L, Pub) $←− KAS.Setup(1ρ, (L,6))
foreach x ∈ L :
α(x)← {κx, σx}
φ← P
stM ← (φ, {α(x) : x ∈ L})
foreach u ∈ U :
stu ← (σλ(u), λ(u))
foreach o ∈ O :
d(o)
$←− (SE.Encryptκλ(o)(d(o)), o, λ(o))
FS ←
{
d(o) : o ∈ O
}
ψ ← (Pub, (L,6))
Π← (ψ, FS)
return (stM, {stu}u∈U ,Π)
d(o)← Read(o, stu,Π)
if o /∈ O : return ⊥
κλ(o) ← KAS.Derive(λ(o), λ(u), σλ(u), Pub)
if κλ(o) 6=⊥ :
Parse d(o) as (co, o, λ(o))
return SE.Decryptκλ(o)(c0)
return ⊥
Π
$←−Write(o, d(o)′, stM,Π)
if o /∈ O : return ⊥
d(o)
$←− (SE.Encryptκλ(o)(d(o)
′), o, λ(o))
FS ←
{
d(o) : o ∈ O
}
Π← (ψ, FS)
return Π
Figure 3: A Writeable, Centralized CES using a KAS
an example CES instantiation using a KAS (KAS) and a symmetric
encryption scheme (SE) where the key space for KAS and SE is the
same. The manager state includes all generated keys and secrets;
each user state includes the secret assigned to the user’s security
label, and Π includes the public information output by the KAS.
Theorem 5.1. Let KAS be secure in the sense of key indistinguisha-
bility and let SE be IND-CPA secure. Then the instantiation in Figure 3
is a secure static, writeable, centralized, non-refreshable CES.
The proof of Theorem 5.1 can be found in Appendix A. It is
interesting to note that, although KASs are often proposed as sym-
metric cryptographic enforcement mechanisms for information
flow policies, the natural pairing of a KI-secure KAS and an IND-
CPA secure encryption scheme yields a rather basic CES according
to our classifications. Indeed, it appears that constructing a richer
class of CES using current KASs as a black box (i.e. using the de-
fined algorithms without using the particular details of a specific
instantiation) would be challenging. Current KASs specify only
two algorithms and the Setup algorithm generates and outputs all
public and secret information for the entire system; there is no al-
ternative method by which to generate subsets of this information.
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Thus allowing for dynamic or refreshable CESs will be problematic
— there is no mechanism by which a single key can be generated
or replaced for example. Whilst some KAS constructions do allow
for some aspects to be altered [4], this mechanism is scheme de-
pendent and does not form part of the definition or, crucially, the
security model. Future work on KASs should aim to meet the re-
quirements of our proposed framework if they are to ensure utility
as a component of a CES; in particular, a KAS used to instantiate a
more complex CES will require algorithms to update and refresh
components, and the KI security notion will need to be adapted to
accommodate changes to cryptographic material over time.
Our second example uses a large-universe key-policy attribute-
based encryption (KP-ABE) [17] scheme:
• (MK , PP) $←− Setup(1ρ ) takes a security parameter and
outputs a master secret and public parameters;
• C $←− Encrypt(m,γ , PP) takes a message m, a set of at-
tributes γ and PP, and outputs a ciphertext;
• kA ← KeyGen(A,MK , PP) takes as input an access struc-
ture (policy) A, the master secret key and public parame-
ters, and outputs a key for the policy; and
• (m or ⊥) ← Decrypt(C,kA, PP) takes a ciphertext C en-
cryptingm using an attribute set γ , a key kA for a policy A
and PP. It outputs the encrypted messagem if γ ∈ A (the
policy is satisfied) or ⊥ otherwise.
Then, Figure 4 gives an instantiation of a dynamic, centralized,
refreshable, writeable CES. Each security label is associated with
an attribute, objects are encrypted using the singleton attribute set
{λ(o)} and user decryption keys are generated using the disjunc-
tive policy
∨
l⩽λ(u) l ; hence users can decrypt any object where
λ(o) ⩽ λ(u) as required. Whilst more efficient instantiations are
likely possible (e.g. using revocable KP-ABE [24]), we have aimed
here to use a simple, standard KP-ABE scheme. We use a large-
universe construction (where any string can be an attribute) to
enable ‘versions’ of attributes to disable out-of-date keys (a counter
is appended to each attribute and is updated whenever a user loses
access to an object assigned that attribute).
Again, by considering cryptographic primitives within our frame-
work, it becomes apparent that some existing proposals for enforce-
ment mechanisms for access control are not entirely sufficient.
For example, whilst there are many works considering revocation
within ABE [24, 25], it seems more difficult to reduce access rights
rather than remove the user completely without assigning an en-
tirely new user identifier.
6 CONCLUSION
We have developed a rigorous definitional framework for the cryp-
tographic enforcement of information flow policies. Our framework
has been developed ‘bottom up’ from the requirements of the ac-
cess control policy, rather than targeting a particular cryptographic
primitive or application scenario. We have provided several ex-
ample classes of CES and discussed the algorithmic requirements
of each, and provided a formal notion of correctness and security.
Finally we have provided two instantiations, based on very differ-
ent primitives, to exemplify the utility of our framework. Further
work should develop the definitions for key assignment schemes to
meet the requirements of our framework for richer classes of CES.
One could also expand our framework to consider other policies,
including write-access, and security goals such as hiding the labels
of users and objects.
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(stM, {msgu}u∈U ,Π) $←− Setup(1ρ, P )
Parse P = ((L,6), U,O, λ)
(MK,PP)
$←− ABE.Setup(1ρ)
for l ∈ L :
A[l]← 0
kM
$←− ABE.KeyGen((
∨
l∈L
l||A[l]),MK,PP)
φ← (A, kM , P,MK)
stM ← φ
foreach u ∈ U :
ku
$←− ABE.KeyGen((
∨
l6λ(u)
l||A[l]),MK,PP)
stu ← (ku, λ(u))
foreach o ∈ O :
co
$←− ABE.Encrypt(d(o), {λ(o)||A[λ(o)]} ,PP)
d(o)← (co, o, λ(o))
FS ←
{
d(o) : o ∈ O
}
ψ ← (PP, (L,6))
Π← (ψ, FS)
return (stM, {stu}u∈U ,Π)
d(o)← Read(o, stu,Π)
if o ∈ O :
Parse d(o) = (co, o, λ(o))
Parse stu = (ku, λ(u))
return ABE.Decrypt(co, ku,PP)
return ⊥
(stM, {msgu}u∈U ,Π) $←− Refresh(l, stM,Π)
if l ∈ L :
A[l] = A[l] + 1
k′M
$←− ABE.KeyGen((
∨
l∈L
l||A[l]),MK,PP)
foreach u ∈ {u ∈ U : l 6 λ(u)} :
stu
$←− (ABE.KeyGen((
∨
l′6λ(u)
l′||A[l′]),MK,PP), λ(u))
foreach o ∈ {o ∈ O : λ(o) = l} :
Parse d(o) = (co, o, λ(o))
d← ABE.Decrypt(co, kM ,PP)
d(o)
$←− (ABE.Encrypt(d, {λ(o)||A[λ(o)]} ,PP), o, λ(o))
φ← (A, k′M , P,MK)
stM ← φ
FS ←
{
d(o) : o ∈ O
}
Π← (ψ, FS)
return (stM, {stu}u∈U ,Π)
return (stM, ∅,Π)
(stM, {msgu}u∈U ,Π) $←− ChObL(o, l′, stM,Π)
if o ∈ O and l′ ∈ L \ unionsq :
l← λ(o)
Parse d(o) = (co, o, λ(o))
d← ABE.Decrypt(co, kM ,PP)
d(o)
$←− ABE.Encrypt(d,{l′||A[l′]} ,PP), o, l′)
FS ←
{
d(o) : o ∈ O
}
λ(o)← l′
Π← (ψ, FS)
return Refresh(l, stM,Π)
return (stM, ∅,Π)
(stM, {msgu}u∈U ,Π) $←− ChUsL(u, l′, stM,Π)
if u ∈ U and l′ ∈ L \ u :
X ← {l ∈ L : l 6 λ(u), l 6 l′}
foreach x ∈ X :
A[x] = A[x] + 1
foreach o ∈ {o ∈ O : λ(o) = x} :
Parse d(o) = (co, o, λ(o))
d← ABE.Decrypt(co, kM ,PP)
d(o)
$←− (ABE.Encrypt(d, {λ(o)||A[λ(o)]} ,PP), o, λ(o))
if X 6= ∅ :
kM
$←− ABE.KeyGen((
∨
l∈L
l||A[l]),MK,PP)
φ← (A, kM , P,MK)
stM ← φ
FS ←
{
d(o) : o ∈ O
}
Π← (ψ, FS)
foreach u′ ∈ {u′ ∈ U \ u : ∃x ∈ X,x 6 λ(u′)} :
stu′
$←− (ABE.KeyGen((
∨
x6λ(u′)
x||A[x]),MK,PP), λ(u′))
λ(u)← l′
stu
$←− (ABE.KeyGen((
∨
x6l′
x||A[x]),MK,PP), l′)
return (stM, {stu}u∈U ,Π)
return (stM, ∅,Π)
Π
$←−Write(o, d(o)′, stM,Π)
if o ∈ O :
d(o)
$←− (ABE.Encrypt(d(o)′, {λ(o)||A[λ(o)]} ,PP), o, λ(o))
FS ←
{
d(o) : o ∈ O
}
Π← (ψ, FS)
return Π
Figure 4: Construction of a Dynamic, Centralized, Refreshable, Writeable CES using Attribute-based Encryption
ExpS−KI−STA,(L,6) (1
ρ)
l?
$←− A(1ρ, (L,6))
((σl, κl)l∈L, Pub)
$←− Setup(1ρ, (L,6))
b
$←− {0, 1} ; if b = 1 then κ? ← κl? , else κ? $←− K
b′ $←− A(Pub, Corrupt,Keys, κ?)
return b′ = b
Figure 5: Static Strong Key Indistinguishability of a KAS
[25] Jun-lei Qian and Xiao-lei Dong. 2011. Fully secure revocable attribute-based
encryption. Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University (Science) 16 (2011), 490–496.
A SECURITY PROOF OF THEOREM 1
A symmetric-key encryption scheme [5] comprises:
• SK $←− KeyGen(1ρ ) takes a security parameter and outputs
a secret key.
• c $←− EncryptSK (m) takes as input a secret key SK and a
messagem and outputs a ciphertext c .
• (m or ⊥) ← DecryptSK (c) takes a key and a ciphertext,
and outputs a messagem or a failure symbol ⊥.
A KAS is Strongly Key Indistinguishable (SKI) [13] if for all PPT
adversaries A and posets (L,⩽):
2
Pr [ExpS−KI−STA,(L,⩽)(1ρ ) = b ] − 12  ⩽ f (ρ),
where f is a negligible function, ExpS−KI−STA,(L,⩽)(1ρ ) is given in Figure
5 where K is the key space, Corrupt =
{
σl : l ∈ L, l < l⋆
}
and
Keys =
{
κl : l ∈ L, l , l⋆
}
.
Proof. We first define a modified game, Game 1, which is the
same as that defined in Definition 4.2 (which we call Game 0)
except that the key used to encrypt the challenge object o⋆ is chosen
randomly rather than derived within the KAS. We show that an
adversary cannot distinguish Game 1 from Game 0 with non-
negligible advantage. Therefore, we may run the adversary against
Game 1, and with all but negligible probability, the adversary will
run correctly.
Having transitioned to Game 1, we are in a position where the
challenge encryption is generated using a random key; therefore
we can reduce security to IND-CPA of the symmetric encryption
scheme. We show that if an adversary ACES can break the secu-
rity of our CES, then we can construct an adversary AI ND that,
using ACES as a subroutine, can break the IND-CPA security of
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the symmetric encryption scheme. Since the encryption scheme is
assumed to be secure, such an adversary should not exist; therefore
a successful adversary against the CES cannot exist.
Although Theorem 5.1 requires a Key Indistinguishable (KI) KAS,
we instead use the Strong KI (SKI) [13] property instead which is
polynomially equivalent [7] but provides the adversary with all
keys (except the challenge key) to model key leakage. We find SKI
more convenient for proving interactive reductions as all keys are
immediately available.
We first show that Game 1 is indistinguishable from Game 0.
Suppose, for contradiction, that ACES is an adversary that can
distinguish these games. Let CKI be a challenger for the SKI game.
We construct an adversaryAKI which usesACES to break the SKI
security of the KAS.
AKI must simulate either Game 0 or Game 1 for ACES . It
forms a policy P , using (L,⩽) from its game with CKI , and its
choice of U ,O and λ. Note that AKI is given a single challenge
key for a single security label and that, in this static CES, all keys
are replaced whenever Refresh is called. Thus, to correctly embed
the SKI challenge into Game 0 or Game 1 before ACES decides
its challenge parameters, AKI must guess the challenge label that
ACES will choose and which version of that key will be challenged
(i.e. how many times Refresh will be called before the challenge).
Let r be a counter, initially 0, denoting the number of calls ACES
makes toRefresh. Thus,AKI makes a guess c $← L for the challenge
label and guesses i $← {0, 1, . . . ,q}, for q = poly(ρ), for the value
of r when the challenge parameters are chosen.
AKI sends c to CKI as its SKI challenge label. CKI runs
({σl ,κl }l ∈L , Pub) $←− KAS.Setup(1ρ , (L,⩽)), and chooses a random
bit b $← {0, 1}; if b = 0, κ⋆ = κc , else κ⋆ is chosen randomly from
the key space. CKI sends the KAS public information, the set of all
keys except for the challenge key, the set of all secrets for labels
l ′ ⩽ c , and the challenge key κ⋆ to AKI . AKI initializes Cr = ∅
and o⋆ =⊥.
Now, if i , 0, then AKI does not embed the challenger’s out-
puts in the initial CES setup. Instead, it runs Setup as in Figure 3,
running KAS.Setup itself. Else, when i = 0, AKI sets stM to
include {{σl ′ : l ′ < c, l ′ ∈ L} , {κl : l ∈ L \ {c}}} and Π to include
Pub . For each user, if λ(u) < c , AKI defines stu =
{
σλu , λu
}
, and
stu = {·, λu } otherwise.
ACES is given Π and a set of oracles O as in Figure 2. If ACES
calls CorruptU on a user u ∈ U where λ(u) > c , thenAKI loses the
game (c would now be an invalid challenge and so the initial guess
of c was wrong). Similarly, AKI loses if ACES chooses o⋆ such
that λ(o⋆) , c . Whenever the Refresh oracle is called, r is increased
by 1.
When r = i ,AKI runsRefresh but instead of runningKAS.Setup,
it uses the key material received from CKI , and re-initializes the
state of the manager, users, and objects as described above in Setup
where i = 0. AKI loses the game if r exceeds i and ACES has not
yet chosen a challenge object.
Eventually, ACES guesses that it was playing Game b ′. AKI
forwards b ′ toCKI as its guess of whether the key for the challenge
label was real (b = 0) or random (b = 1). AKI wins with non-
negligible probability Adv(ACES )q |L | where q = poly(ρ) is the number
of calls to the refresh oracle. Since the KAS is assumed SKI-secure,
such a distinguisher ACES with non-negligible advantage cannot
exist. We can therefore hop from Game 0 to Game 1.
We now show that if an adversary ACES playing Game 1
can identify the message written to a challenge object with non-
negligible probability, then an adversary AI ND can use ACES to
win the IND-CPA game against a challenger CI ND .
CI ND randomly selects a key k from the key space, selects a
random bit b $← {0, 1}, and gives AI ND access to an encryption
oracle ηk,b , which takes two messagesm0,m1 of the same length
and always outputs the encryption of mb under key k . (We use
the LoR IND-CPA game instead of Find-then-Guess [5] as it allows
multiple challenges; thus we need only guess the challenge label
and not the object itself.)
AI ND runs line 1 of the CES experiment and guesses the se-
curity label c of the challenge object o⋆ that ACES will choose.
All encryptions using the key κc will be replaced by encryptions
under k . When an object o with label c is to be written, the ad-
versary calls the encryption oracle ηk,b on inputs (d(o)′,d(o)′) to
obtain an encryption under k . AI ND runs line 2 of the CES exper-
iment and gives oracle access to ACES . If ACES corrupts a user
u ∈ U such that λ(u) ⩾ c , the experiment fails (the guess of c was
wrong). Eventually, ACES chooses a challenge object o⋆ and two
messages m0,m1. If λ(o⋆) , c , the experiment fails; else, AI ND
calls ηk,b (m0,m1), and writes the result to d(o⋆).
Eventually, ACES sends b ′ to AI ND as its guess of b; AI ND
forwards this toCI ND . IfACES can correctly guess which data was
written with non-negligible advantage Adv(ACES ), then AI ND
wins the IND-CPA game with non-negligible advantage Adv(ACES )|L | .
This is a contradiction, since the encryption scheme is assumed
IND-CPA secure. □
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